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On International Equity Weights and National 





Estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the aggregation 
of monetised impacts of climate change over people with different incomes and in different 
jurisdictions. Implicitly or explicitly, such estimates assume a social welfare function and 
hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice. We show that previous approaches to 
equity weighing are inappropriate from a national decision maker’s point of view, because 
domestic impacts are not valued at domestic values. We propose four alternatives 
(sovereignty, altruism, good neighbour, and compensation) with different views on concern 
for and liability towards foreigners. The four alternatives imply radically estimates of the 
social cost of carbon and hence the optimal intensity of climate policy. 
JEL Code: Q54. 

















Equity weights, in one form or other, are now frequently used to aggregate the monetized 
impacts of climate change that would befall different countries (Azar, 1999; Azar and 
Sterner, 1996; Fankhauser et al., 1997, 1998; Pearce, 2003; Tol, 1999). Equity weights 
reflect that a dollar to a poor person is not the same as a dollar to a rich person. That is, 
one cannot add up monetized welfare losses across disparate incomes. Instead, one 
should add up welfare losses and then monetize. Equity weighting does just that, albeit 
with a linear approximation. 
Equity weights have a long history in cost-benefit analysis and public economics (e.g. 
Little and Mirrlees 1974); see Johansson-Stenman (2005) for a recent discussion. 
However, these papers are all about equity weighting in the context of national decision-
making. Fankhauser et al. (1997) introduced equity weights into the discussion on 
international climate change policy. 
The aggregation of welfare losses to different countries assumes a supranational 
perspective. Indeed, the formal derivation of equity weights presumes a global social 
planner. Fankhauser et al. (1997) assumed this for convenience, at a time when there was 
still some hope of widespread international cooperation for greenhouse gas emission 
reduction. As an academic exercise, this is fine. However, equity-weighted worldwide 
marginal damage cost estimates for carbon dioxide are also used by the European 
Commission and the UK Government in their cost-benefit analysis of domestic policies 
(CEC, 2005; Clarkson and Deyes, 2002). 
This is peculiar. Within countries, equity weights are shunned. Instead, the welfare loss 
of some average person is used.
1 This is because the democratic principle of “one person, 
one vote” sits awkwardly with the notion that some people are worthier than others. 
Between countries, matters are different, as the world is made up of sovereign nations. 
One can, of course, argue that as a matter of principle one should act on the basis of how 
the world ought to be, not how the world is. If one then further believes that democracy is 
good, then one would probably argue for using the global average welfare loss to guide 
climate policy. Combined with the assumption that willingness to pay for climate change 
impacts varies linearly with per capita income, certain equity weights are indeed 
equivalent to global average values (see below). These are many ifs. 
The UK Government and the European Commission, however, answer to the people of 
the UK and (ultimately) the EU, respectively, not to the people of the world. Using equity 
weights for impacts of climate change, impacts in Africa, say, are valued higher than the 
average African would; while impacts in Europe are valued lower than the average 
European would. At the same time, in Europe, health impacts, say, due to climate change 
                                                 
1 Note that, although every citizen is in principle considered equally worthy regardless of their income, 
poorer areas are often dirtier (Brown, 1995). are valued less than health impacts due to air pollution, say. This is most peculiar. 
Pretending to be the world government, the UK Government and the European 
Commission short-change the people they actually represent. And, the application of 
monetization and cost-benefit techniques introduces inconsistencies. 
This of course is the consequence of using equity weights only for specific policy areas, 
i.e. climate change, which is wrong from a theoretical point of view. Equity weights are 
an all-or-nothing thing: Once a decision-maker opts to use equity weights, she has to use 
equity weights for all her decision-making procedures, otherwise inconsistencies between 
various policy arenas will arise. If the UK opted to use equity weights for all its cost-
benefit analysis, no such problems would arise. While in theory it is clear how equity 
weights should be used by a national decision maker without introducing inconsistencies 
in its decision making process, these guidelines are not followed in practise. Equity 
weights are used in the context of climate change by the UK government and the EU, but 
not for other policy areas. The resulting inconsistencies are grave and cannot be justified 
by any known theoretical argument. 
Instead, in the absence of international cooperation, a national government committed to 
climate policy and cost-benefit analysis has five options. First, a country could ignore 
impacts outside its territory. Second, a country could care about foreign impacts to the 
extent that its citizens care about foreigners. These two options are numerically close; and 
they reflect tough realpolitik. Third, a country could argue that it has the duty to protect 
foreigners to the same extent as it does its own citizens. This is common practice for 
health and safety: Foreign visitors and resident enjoy the same level of protection as do 
citizens. Here, foreign impacts would be valued the same as domestic impacts. Fourth, a 
country could argue that it has the duty to be a good neighbour
2 and prevent damage to 
others and, failing that, feel guilty about the welfare loss it caused abroad. Fifth, a 
country could offer compensation for the damages it caused abroad, because it feels 
morally obliged to do so; or because it is told to by a court. Compensation presumably 
equals the damage done, and foreign impacts would be assessed with foreign values. We 
argue below that option 3 and 4 are identical under certain conditions. This paper 
therefore presents four alternative estimates of the marginal damage costs estimates for 
various world regions – and we compare these four alternatives to two estimates that are 
commonly used. We show that the different estimates differ not only in the values 
assigned to impacts abroad, but also in the discount rate used. 
Section 2 formalizes the above discussion and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the numerical model used for estimating marginal damage costs. Section 4 
shows the results. Section 5 discusses and concludes. 
 
2. Equity  weighting 
 
2.1. Previous  work 
                                                 













⎝⎠ ∑  (1) 
where Di is the damage in country i, i=1,2, …, N; U is the utility function of country i, 
and UC is its first partial derivative to average per capita consumption C; WU is its first 
partial derivative of the global welfare function to utility; WM is a normalization constant 
to go back from welfare to money – WM is the first partial derivative to average per capita 
consumption, evaluated at the optimal point; DW is the global damage. 
The normalization constant has an element of arbitrariness. In this case, the anchor point 
is a world that is fair (according to the welfare function), and the damage is spread in an 
equitable manner. If the anchor point were an unfair world because of reasons other than 
climate change, the valuation of climate change would reflect such inequities – and we 
may end up using greenhouse gas emission reduction to rectify other wrongs than climate 
change. In this sense, the chosen normalisation reflects first-best policy. 
If we use a utilitarian global welfare function, and a CRRA (constant rate of risk 














⎝⎠ ∑  (2) 
where CW is the world average per capita consumption, and ε is the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to income. Clearly, countries with an income above (below) the world 
average receive a low (high) weight, and this is more pronounced as the utility function is 
more curved. Indeed, with a linear utility function (ε =0), equity weights would equal 
unity.
3 
We now reconstruct (1) and (2) for a national decision maker. 
 
2.2 Welfare  functions 
Let’s assume that an individual utility function is specified as: 
                                                 
3 Climate change damages are typically approximated by the direct costs (that is price times quantity) with 
constant prices. If the “price”, or rather unit value, is linear in per capita income (that is, the income 
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where Ic is the impact in country c, Vc is its unit value, and VW is the world average value. Under these 
assumptions, all impacts are effectively valued the same – and at the world average. Note that the crucial 
assumption is that the relative rate of risk aversion equals the income elasticity of willingness to pay, not 
that both are unity. Although these parameters are related, they are the same under exceptional 











This is a conventional CRRA utility function. 
We further assume that the national policy maker optimises a welfare function that is 
defined over the utility of individuals. In particular, we look at welfare functions that take 
the sum of individual utilities. This utilitarian assumption is disputable, but it is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on variations of utilitarian welfare and the 
consequences for the social cost of carbon. Each represents a specific policy position of a 
national decision maker. 
 
2.2.1  Impacts abroad are ignored 
If a national planner is indifferent to what happens abroad, the welfare function is 
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where  , ti C  is consumption of agent i at time t, T is the end of the time horizon the policy 
maker is taking into account,  t N  is the population size at time t and ρ is the pure rate of 
time preference. 
In practise, policy makers do not have data on an individual basis. We therefore use a 
welfare function based on average per capita consumption: 
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where  t C  is average per capita consumption at time t in the region of the policy maker 
and  t P  is the population size of the region at time t. We omit the average bars from here 
on. 
The social cost of carbon (SCC), or marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions, is 
defined as the damage done by a small change in emissions E today (t=0). In utils, we 
take the utility effect of a marginal change in consumption caused by climate change, and 
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(7) where gt is the average annual growth rate of per capita consumption between now and 
year t. 
 
2.2.2  Impacts abroad reduce domestic welfare 
If the social planner is altruistic towards people abroad, the welfare function is 
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Here Ct,i is average per capita consumption in country i at time t; N is the number of 
countries; u* specifies the foreign utility function of the domestic planner; it may be a 
scaled transformation of u, that is u*= φu with 0<φ<1. 
The corresponding scc (in utils) follows as 
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(10) 
where gt,i is the average annual growth rate of per capita consumption between now and 
year t in region i. 
For φ=0, this reduces to (7). 
 
2.2.3 Good  neighbour 
It is well established, both morally and legally, that one should not do damage to others, 
or compensate them if damage is done nonetheless. Here we assume that compensation is 
not possible. Compensation is dealt with below. 
If the obligation not to do damage is interpreted as a hard constraint, the implications are 
simple: One should reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero. Here we instead assume 
that the domestic policy maker takes welfare losses abroad caused by herself into 
account. 
Note that this is not the same as altruism. An altruistic agent cares about other agents. A 
good neighbour only cares about her impact on other agents. Altruism may evolve if 
survival and procreation are enhanced by the well-being of others. These others are probably a small group of close relatives. Good neighbourliness may evolve if survival 
and procreation could be reduced by the wrath of others. We do not present an 
evolutionary game, however, but simply assume that good neighbourliness is in the 
welfare function. 
This may be specified as 
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where Δu is the damage done abroad by domestic action, expressed as a reduction in 
welfare abroad. 
The scc is then 
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Note that (13) equals (10) for φ=1. 
Note further that, if the income elasticity of the willingness to pay for climate change 
impacts equals the rate of risk aversion, then Equation (17) is equivalent to assuming that 
impacts abroad are valued at domestic prices (cf. footnote 3). This is an alternative 
interpretation of good neighbourliness. 
 
2.2.4  Impacts abroad are compensated 
One can imagine a situation in which climate change damages are fully internalized, i.e. 
the emitter of greenhouse gas emissions fully compensates those that suffer damages. In 
particular, one can imagine a set of international treaties which puts the obligation to pay 
compensation for damages caused to every nation. We are not particularly concerned in 
this paper how or whether such a situation could arise. We merely assume that there is 
some external forcing or reasoning due to which compensation is paid. This is not the 
same as good-neighbour-with-compensation, as that would have compensation as a decision variable.
4 The important point is that compensation payments are not happening 
because there is a desire to do so; rather there is an obligation. 
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where L is the total compensation paid to country i and L* is the compensation received. 
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Note that the compensation is discounted with the social discount rate based on the 
domestic growth rate. This follows because the welfare loss is a domestic loss through 
compensation. Intuitively, the damage abroad is paid for by the domestic consumers and 
should therefore be discounted using their discount rate. 
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There are two differences between (13) and (17). Firstly, damage abroad has an equity 
weight in (13) but not in (17). Secondly, damage abroad is discounted with the discount 
factor abroad in (13), but with the domestic discount rate in (17). 
 
2.2.5. Overview 







tt i t i t i
ti t
C C







∂∂ ∑∑ ∑      (18) 
The alternative positions follow from the appropriate choices for φ, the equity weight ω, 
and the discount factor DF. See Table 1. For completeness, Table 1 also includes the 
                                                 
4 Note that the solution would lie somewhere in between the good-neighbour-without-compensation case 
derived above and the full-compensation case derived below. cooperative solution – in which the regions jointly maximise the sum of the sovereign 
welfare as specified in Equation (4) – equity weights for the global decision maker 
(Equation 2), and a case inspired by symmetry, but for which we could not find an 
interpretation. 
Note that in all cases domestic impacts are valued with domestic values. 
 
3. The  model 
This paper uses version 2.9 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.9 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and 
applied by Tol (1999, 2001, 2002a), except for the impact module, which is described by 
Tol (2002b,c) and updated by Link and Tol (2004). A further difference is that the current 
version of the model distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions. The model considers emission 
reduction of methane and nitrous oxide as well as carbon dioxide, as described by Tol 
(2006a). Finally, the model now has sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and a newly calibrated 
radiative forcing code. A full list of papers, the source code and the technical 
documentation for the model can be found on line at  
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html. Readers familiar with FUND can skip to 
Section 4 without loosing any continuity in our argument. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous 
perturbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United 
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central 
America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one 
year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact 
module. In FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed to depend on the impact of 
the previous year, this way reflecting the process of adjustment to climate change. 
Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, 
both physical and monetized impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the 
first few decades of the model runs. The 22
nd and 23
rd centuries are included to assess the 
long-term implications of climate change. Previous versions of the model stopped at 
2200. 
The period of 1950-2000 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes & Goldewijk, 1994). The scenario for the period 2010-
2100 is based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between 
IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the 
immediate past (http://earthtrends.wri.org), and the period 2100-2300 extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of the 
energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon 
dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide. 
Welfare comparisons between regions figure prominently in some of the national social 
cost definitions of Section 2, in the form of ratios of per capita consumption. Therefore, we measure income in purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP). This also affects 
the scenario. The original scenario is formulated in terms of market exchange rates 
(MER). It assumes a narrowing of the income gap between rich and poor. Following Tol 
(2006b), we assume an income elasticity of –0.28 for the PPP to MER ratio. That is, in 
the PPP scenario, poor regions are richer at the start, but grow more slowly. This also 
affects emissions. Following Tol (2006b), we also adjust the scenario for energy 
efficiency improvements, such that the drop in the growth rate of energy use is halfway 
between the drop in economic growth rate and zero. That is, emissions grow less fast in 
the PPP scenario, but faster than a naïve adjustment with the economic growth rate would 
suggest (cf. Castles and Henderson, 2003). At the same time, the adjusted scenario for 
energy efficiency does not fully offset the adjusted income scenario either (cf. Gruebler et 
al., 2004). 
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of climatic 
change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that result 
from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold 
stress are assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive population. In 
contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of births. Heat stress only 
affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among the total 
population is based on the World Resources Databases (http://earthtrends.wri.org). It is 
extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization and per-capita 
income, which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-induced 
migration between the regions of the world also causes the population sizes to change. 
Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective 
host population. 
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy (cf. Fankhauser and Tol, 
2005). Consumption and investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a 
result, climate change reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is 
particularly affected in the short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon 
dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon 
intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be 
accelerated by abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean temperature, 
the impact of carbon dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and 
the impact of the damages to the economy and the population caused by climate change. 
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically 
depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million 
by volume, is represented by the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann 
(1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992). The model also contains 
sulphur emissions (Tol, 2006a) 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride and 
sulphur aerosols is determined based on Ramaswamy et al. (2001). The global mean 
temperature T is governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the 
radiative forcing RF), with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean 
temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed 
factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs 
(Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also geometric, with its 
equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years. Both 
temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and 
sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002b,c) includes the following categories: 
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to 
cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy 
consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related 
damages can be attributed to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the 
level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change 
slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they 
can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects are 
monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita 
income. The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range of 
values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the 
per capita income (Tol, 1995), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita 
income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level 
rise are modelled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of 
dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). 
Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses 
are valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. 
Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have logistic relation to per capita 
income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of 
additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, are 
directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts measured 
in their ‘natural’ units (cf. Tol, 2002b). Impacts of climate change on energy 
consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize 
that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including 
plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative 
depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or away from 
that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are further away 
from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with regard to the 
potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, depending on the 
speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new climate conditions are 
always negative (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water 
resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple 
power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign (cf. 
Tol, 2002c).  Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as 
water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), and 
ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are projected to 
become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological progress), 
agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases (with improved 
health care) (cf. Tol, 2002c). The income elasticities in Tol (2002c) are estimated with 




Table 3 shows the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide for a pure rate of time 
preference of 1% per year and a constant rate of relative risk aversion of 1. The simple 
sum of the regional marginal damage costs is $16/tC, well within the range of estimates 
in previous studies (Tol, 2005). Split over 16 regions, under sovereignty, the marginal 
damage costs per region are obviously much lower. China stands out as very vulnerable. 
This is due to a range of factors, including its large size, aging population, precarious 
water supply, and economic concentration in the coastal zone. 
The equation for compensated marginal damage costs is similar to that in the cooperative 
case, but the discount rate is different. For regions with slow (fast) growth, the 
compensated marginal damage costs are higher (lower) than the cooperative costs. Cf. 
Table 2. 
The equity-weighted marginal damage costs are $28/tC, almost double the simple sum as 
more weight is placed on the higher impacts in the poorer regions. Good-neighbourliness 
is similar to equity-weighting, but the normalisation is done with the regional rather than 
the world average income. As a result, good-neighbour marginal damage costs are much 
higher than equity-weighted damages for rich regions, and lower for poor regions. Cf. 
Table 2. 
The altruistic marginal damage costs are somewhere in between the sovereign costs and 
the good-neighbour costs. We here use φ=0.1. 
The relative magnitudes of the marginal damage costs also give some insight into the 
preferences of regions. In every region, the sovereign damage costs are lowest. That is, 
free-riding pays. In the OECD, cooperation would lead to lower emission reduction than 
compensation and good neighbourliness.
5 In the poorest regions, being a good neighbour 
would imply the lowest emission reduction obligations (apart from sovereignty). In 
middle income countries, compensation would imply the minimum emission reduction. It 
is therefore unlikely that regions would be anonymous in agreeing what would be the 
                                                 
5 The equity-weighted marginal damage costs are also lower than the compensated and good neighbour 
ones for the OECD. However, equity-weighted marginal damage costs cannot be compared to unweighted 
regional marginal abatement costs. “right” framework for setting marginal damage costs and hence marginal abatement 
costs. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the same information, but for pure rates of time preference of 0% 
and 3%, respectively, in Table 3, the value is 1%. As one would expect, lower (higher) 
discount rates lead to higher (lower) marginal damage costs estimates. However, the 
relative positions of sovereign, cooperative, equity-weighted, altruistic, compensated, and 
good neighbour marginal damage costs is unchanged. 
Tables 6 and 8 repeat this information for constant rates of relative risk aversion of 0.5 
and 1.5, respectively; in Table 3, the value is 1.0. Changing the CCRA has two effects: 
First, the equity weights change. Second, the discount rate changes. These two effects 
work in the opposite direction. 
Equity weights are unity for sovereign, cooperative, and compensated marginal damage 
costs. A higher (lower) CRRA implies a higher (lower) discount rate and lower (higher) 
marginal damage costs. 
For equity-weighted, altruistic, and good neighbour marginal damage costs, both effects 
are at play. In Tables 7 and 9, we keep the discount rate as in the base case. A higher 
(lower) CRRA implies higher (lower) equity-weights and higher (lower) marginal 
damage costs. 
Returning to Tables 6 and 8, we see that the equity-weight effect tends to dominate the 
discount-rate effect, but there are exceptions, as for example good-neighbour marginal 
costs in Japan and South Korea. 
 
5. Discussion  and  conclusion 
Climate change is a global problem, but decisions are made by national decision makers. 
In previous papers, researchers have discussed the appropriate carbon tax for a global 
decision maker. Here, we discuss the appropriate carbon tax for a national decision 
maker. We distinguish four different cases. First, the national decision maker does not 
care about what happens abroad. Second, the national decision maker is altruistic towards 
foreigners. Third, the national decision maker compensates damages done abroad. Fourth, 
the national decision makers feels responsible for damages done abroad, but cannot 
compensate. Carbon taxes are lowest in the first case (sovereignty). They are highest in 
the fourth case (good neighbour) for the richest regions, and in the third case 
(compensation) for the poorest regions. Middle income regions may face the highest 
carbon taxes under international cooperation. This order is robust to the choice of the 
pure rate of time preference and the constant rate of relative risk aversion, but carbon 
taxes are higher if the pure rate of time preference is lower, and carbon taxes tend to be 
higher if the rate of risk aversion is higher. 
Further research in this field would certainly be welcome. The analysis here should be 
reproduced with other integrated assessment models. A wider range of utility and welfare 
functions should be explored, and the link between the utility function and the 
willingness to pay for climate change impacts should be made. The interactions between 
risk and inequity aversion should be added. The resolution of the model should be refined, and further interactions between actors should be added. The analysis should be 
extended to a cost-benefit analysis. 
The policy implications are twofold. On the one hand, a wide range of carbon taxes can 
be defended. The highest carbon tax differs from the lowest carbon tax by up to a factor 
70 for a 1% pure rate of time preference, and up to a factor 470 for a 0% PRTP. On the 
other hand, this large difference is due to different ethical positions on the kind of 
responsibility one country should have towards other countries. Such positions can be 
debated, and although reasonable people will disagree, politicians should be able to 
resolve this. Indeed, some would argue that that is what politicians are for. 
The results presented here show that, without cooperation, different regions should have 
different carbon taxes. This is not news. See Bradford (2005), Helm (2002), Rehdanz and 
Tol (2005), and Tol (2005) for ways to reconcile non-cooperative target-setting with 
international trade in emission permits. However, this paper also shows that a lack of 
international cooperation on target-setting does not necessarily lead to low carbon taxes. 
If countries agree to compensate one another for the damage they do to one another, 
carbon taxes would be substantial. One may argue that that obligation already exists in 
principle – it still has to be confirmed and put into practice for climate change, though. 
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 Table 2. Regional characteristics. 
 Population  Income Impact 
 (millions)  (PPP  $/cap)  (-)  (%  GDP) 
 2000  2100 2000  2100/2000  2100 
USA 278 298  37,317  3.7  -0.51 
CAN 31 34  25,498  3.8 -0.14 
WEU 388  396  30,312  3.9  -0.91 
JPK 171  223  42,872  4.4  0.19 
ANZ 20 28  21,437  3.8  0.47 
EEU 125 126  5,394  6.0  -0.64 
FSU 293  292  4,493  5.2 -4.04 
MDE 241 553  3,397  7.7  1.05 
CAM 137  216  6,783  5.4  -0.12 
SAM 346 537  7,920  5.4  -0.41 
SAS 1,366  2,630  1,984  5.9  -0.45 
SEA 630  1,197  4,588  5.9  -1.49 
CHI 1,315  1,712  5,509  8.1  -0.41 
NAF 143 401  2,248  6.2  -4.40 
SSA 639  1,831  1,198  5.2 -1.99 
SIS 43  66 1,545  9.3  0.29 
World 6,168 10,541  8,580  3.9  -0.63 
 Table 3. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 1% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 1. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 0.91  13.35  33.76  125.27 
CAN 0.07  8.62  33.28  85.60 
WEU 1.54  11.56  32.35  101.76 
JPK 0.30  14.66  27.95  143.92 
ANZ 0.06  7.25  33.15  71.97 
EEU 0.12  1.92  17.89  18.11 
FSU 0.80  2.23  24.32  15.08 
MDE 0.38  1.49  9.82  11.40 
CAM 0.26  2.51  17.28  22.77 
SAM 0.23  2.86  15.11  26.59 
SAS 1.07  1.63  17.28  6.66 
SEA 1.27  2.68  16.42  15.40 
CHI 7.49  8.59  12.70  18.49 
NAF 0.43  1.14  13.39  7.55 
SSA 0.57  0.92  18.85  4.02 
SIS 0.07  0.58  8.54  5.19 
Cooperation 15.56       
Equity weights  27.86       
 Table 4. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 0% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 1. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 5.06  86.45  230.66  818.93 
CAN 0.39  56.31  227.44  559.58 
WEU 9.33  74.91  222.08  665.21 
JPK 2.42  96.26  189.33  940.86 
ANZ 0.39  47.40  226.58  470.45 
EEU 0.83  12.58  117.34  118.37 
FSU 4.99  14.35  164.83  98.61 
MDE 2.70  9.88  61.17  74.55 
CAM 1.83  16.53  109.59  148.86 
SAM 1.40  18.64  94.04  173.81 
SAS 7.31  10.93  114.78  43.54 
SEA 8.08  17.34  105.49  100.69 
CHI 50.30  57.36  84.13  120.90 
NAF 2.51  7.19  85.88  49.34 
SSA 3.49  5.77  121.86  26.29 
SIS 0.48  3.82  54.38  33.91 
Cooperation 101.49       
Equity weights  182.12       Table 5. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 3% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 1. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 0.05  0.57  1.33  5.22 
CAN 0.00  0.36  1.31  3.57 
WEU 0.08  0.49  1.27  4.24 
JPK 0.00  0.60  1.12  6.00 
ANZ 0.00  0.30  1.31  3.00 
EEU 0.00  0.08  0.75  0.75 
FSU 0.04  0.10  0.98  0.63 
MDE 0.01  0.06  0.44  0.48 
CAM 0.01  0.10  0.75  0.95 
SAM 0.01  0.12  0.68  1.11 
SAS 0.04  0.06  0.71  0.28 
SEA 0.05  0.11  0.70  0.64 
CHI 0.31  0.35  0.53  0.77 
NAF 0.02  0.05  0.58  0.31 
SSA 0.03  0.04  0.80  0.17 
SIS 0.00  0.02  0.37  0.22 
Cooperation 0.66      
Equity weights  1.16       
 Table 6. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 1% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 0.5. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 2.13  17.14  84.22  152.17 
CAN 0.16  12.72  83.62  125.78 
WEU 3.80  17.13  82.48  137.14 
JPK 0.87  17.10  76.49  163.10 
ANZ 0.14  11.66  83.46  115.33 
EEU 0.42  6.17  60.85  57.85 
FSU 2.28  7.34  71.29  52.80 
MDE 1.86  6.27  44.57  45.91 
CAM 0.94  7.33  59.45  64.88 
SAM 0.83  7.76  55.35  70.10 
SAS 3.77  6.90  59.94  35.09 
SEA 4.48  9.37  58.09  53.36 
CHI 30.36  33.17  51.30  58.47 
NAF 1.60  5.18  52.39  37.35 
SSA 1.85  4.39  62.35  27.27 
SIS 0.35  3.42  41.72  30.96 
Cooperation 55.87       
Equity weights  71.76       
 Table 7. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 1% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 0.5; risk 
aversion does not affect the money discount rate. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 0.91  4.93  33.76  41.08 
CAN 0.07  3.46  33.28  33.96 
WEU 1.54  5.09  32.35  37.03 
JPK 0.30  4.67  27.95  44.03 
ANZ 0.06  3.16  33.15  31.14 
EEU 0.12  1.67  17.89  15.62 
FSU 0.80  2.15  24.32  14.26 
MDE 0.38  1.59  9.82  12.40 
CAM 0.26  1.98  17.28  17.52 
SAM 0.23  2.10  15.11  18.93 
SAS 1.07  1.91  17.28  9.47 
SEA 1.27  2.58  16.42  14.40 
CHI 7.49  8.32  12.70  15.78 
NAF 0.43  1.39  13.39  10.08 
SSA 0.57  1.25  18.85  7.36 
SIS 0.07  0.90  8.54  8.36 
Cooperation 15.56       
Equity weights  19.37       
 Table 8. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 1% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 1.5. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 0.40  12.70  13.84  123.46 
CAN 0.03  7.00  13.55  69.73 
WEU 0.64  9.61  12.97  90.38 
JPK 0.10  15.29  10.49  152.03 
ANZ 0.02  5.40  13.47  53.76 
EEU 0.04  0.71  5.46  6.78 
FSU 0.29  0.77  8.53  5.16 
MDE 0.08  0.41  2.29  3.39 
CAM 0.07  1.02  5.25  9.57 
SAM 0.07  1.27  4.36  12.07 
SAS 0.31  0.43  5.15  1.51 
SEA 0.37  0.87  4.84  5.32 
CHI 1.91  2.42  3.26  7.00 
NAF 0.12  0.29  3.58  1.83 
SSA 0.18  0.24  5.93  0.71 
SIS 0.01  0.12  1.84  1.04 
Cooperation 4.65      
Equity weights  12.95       
 Table 9. The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure rate 
of time preference of 1% per year and a constant relative rate of risk aversion of 1.5; risk 
aversion does not affect the money discount rate. 
 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good  neighbour 
USA 0.91  43.83  33.76  430.14 
CAN 0.07  24.36  33.28  242.95 
WEU 1.54  32.88  32.35  314.90 
JPK 0.30  53.23  27.95  529.68 
ANZ 0.06  18.78  33.15  187.29 
EEU 0.12  2.47  17.89  23.64 
FSU 0.80  2.52  24.32  17.97 
MDE 0.38  1.53  9.82  11.81 
CAM 0.26  3.57  17.28  33.34 
SAM 0.23  4.41  15.11  42.06 
SAS 1.07  1.49  17.28  5.27 
SEA 1.27  2.99  16.42  18.54 
CHI 7.49  9.18  12.70  24.40 
NAF 0.43  1.02  13.39  6.36 
SSA 0.57  0.76  18.85  2.47 
SIS 0.07  0.43  8.54  3.62 
Cooperation 15.56       
Equity weights  45.11       
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